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ABSTRACTS
citing its recent decision in Richmond v. Campbell, 148 W. Va.
595, 136 S.E.2d 877 (1964).
Disbarment-Evasion of Federal Income Tax
Defendant was previously convicted of a felony for willful
violation of the Internal Revenue Code. He was then brought
before the court in a disciplinary proceeding based on the By-laws
of the West Virginia State Bar which require that an attorney's
license to practice law "shall" be revoked should he be convicted
of a crime involving moral turpitude. Held, willful evasion of pay-
ment of income tax is a crime involving moral turpitude and the
by-laws make license revocation mandatory precluding the court
from considering extenuating circumstances. In Re Mann, 154
S.E.2d 860 (W. Va. 1967).
Refusing to consider extenuating circumstances would appear to
place West Virginia in a minority position. Annot., 59 A.L.R.2d
1398 (1958). The court states the weight of authority is that a
conviction involving the element of fraud is one involving moral
turpitude. However, such conviction does not necessarily dictate
disbarment because the majority will give the defendant an op-
portunity to show himself free of moral turpitude by considering
extenuating circumstances. This is true even in situations where
the statutory language is similar to West Virginia's. Baker v.
Miller, 236 Ind. 20, 138 N.E.2d 145 (1956); Re Halinan, 43 Cal. 2d
243,272 P.2d 768 (1954).
Procedure-Unincorporated Associations
D, a county circuit court, issued a preliminary injunction against
P-relator, an unincorporated labor union, enjoining P from engag-
ing in unlawful picketing. P then sought a writ of prohibition to
prohibit D from perpetuating the preliminary injunction on the
grounds that P, an unincorporated association, is not subject to
suit in its name or as a separate entity. Held, an unincorporated
association may not sue or be sued in its name or as a separate
entity in absence of a statute authorizing such suits. But, an un-
incorporated association may still protect its rights against third
persons by maintaining an action in the name of the State, which
acts in a representative capacity. Therefore, P-relator has properly
maintained this action in the name of the State. Both P and the
State have a bona fide interest in this proceeding, P's interest
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being protection from a void injunction issued without jurisdiction,
and the State's interest being preventing any of its courts from
acting without jurisdiction. Thus the State may properly institute
and maintain a prohibition proceeding to protect the rights of
an unincorporated association such as P. State ex rel. Glass Bottle
Blowers Ass'n of the United States & Canada v. Silver, 155 S.E.2d
564 (W. Va. 1967).
In West Virginia the only unincorporated associations presently
subject to suit under a common name are a cooperative agricultural
marketing or credit association, W. VA. CODE ch. 19, art. 4, § 4
(Michie 1966), and a common carrier, W. VA. CODE ch. 56, art.
3, § 15 (Michie 1966). All other unincorporated associations fall
within the common law rule, that since they have no legal entity
distinct from that of their members they may not sue or be sued
in the organization's own name.
Sales-Warranties Under the Uniform Commercial Code
D, for the purpose of making coke, bought coal from one of two
piles exhibited near the mouth of P's newly opened mine. P had
shown D a sample with a low percentage of ash, suited for coke-
making, taken from another part of the mine. At D's request P
had the coal cleaned and shipped. After the delivery D told P to
stop loading coal until an analysis could be made to determine ash
content, but after looking at the same coal pile, allowed three more
truckloads to be delivered. An analysis of the coal later showed
that the ash content was too high for coke making, and D refused
to pay for the coal. In an action to recover the value, the jury
returned a verdict for P, and judgment was entered thereon. Held,
affirmed. There was no express or implied warranty of merchanti-
bility, an issue properly determined by the jury. D's inspection of
the coal before delivery excluded any warranties under W. VA.
CODE ch. 46, art. 2, § 316 (Michie 1966). Sylvia Coal Co. v.
Mercury Coal and Coke Co., 156 S.E.2d 1 (W. Va. 1967).
As the court points out in its opinion, this is one of the first cases
in West Virginia involving provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code as embodied in W. VA. CODE ch. 46 (Michie 1966). In this
same area of warranties under the Uniform Commercial Code, see
Shreve v. Casto Trailer Sales, Inc., 150 W. Va. 669, 149 S.E.2d 238
(1966).
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